

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)

Nuclear Power Station Emergencies and the Public

- People fear things they don't understand
- Unseen threat cannot see, smell, or taste radiation
- Presence of contamination will escalate fear and anxiety
- Decontamination = loss of possession
- Emergencies and evacuations are extremely stressful
- Pets and livestock may be left behind
- Abandoning most or all of their possessions
- Will they be able to return
- Few individuals have even a basic understanding of radiation
- Even basic radiation principles can be difficult to grasp

Fission Product Barriers


Fuel Clad (FC) - Fuel Clad Barrier consists of cladding material that contains the fuel pellets.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) - RCS primary side and its connections

Containment (CTMT) - Reactor Building and connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves.

This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the Reactor Building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

Containment Barrier thresholds are used as criteria for escalation of the Emergency Classification Level from Alert to a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency.



Barrier Loss and Potential Loss

Loss

The barrier no longer assures containment of radioactive materials

Potential Loss (P-Loss)

Infers an increased probability of barrier loss and decreased certainty of maintaining the barrier

- **ALERT** - Loss or Potential Loss of EITHER: Fuel Clad or RCS
- **SAE** - Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers
- **GE** - Loss of any 2 barriers and Loss or Potential Loss of third barrier.

Emergency Classifications

	Emergency Action Levels			
	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA	GENERAL
Description of plant conditions	Events which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant	Events which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.	Events which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions.	Events which involve actual or imminent substantial fuel degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment.
	Emergency Plan			
Radiation Dose to the public	Radioactivity release detectable by plant radiation monitors and may be from 0.1 to 1 mR/hr measurable offsite.	Radioactivity release detectable by plant radiation monitors and may be from > 10 to <100mR/hr measurable offsite.	Radioactivity release detectable by plant radiation monitors and may be from > 100 to < 1000mR/hr measurable offsite.	Radioactivity release detectable by plant radiation monitors and may be > 1000 mR/hr measurable offsite.

Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs)

- Increase sequentially based on plant conditions and/or increased risk to the public
- A radiological release can occur at any Emergency Classification Level
- Generally, actions to protect the public are not initiated until a General Emergency is declared
- Radiation levels outside of the plant boundary can be significantly above background (400+ times background)
- Very little information is communicated to the public prior to the declaration of a General Emergency and the initiation of protective actions

State Response to a Nuclear Power Station Event

- The Commonwealth mobilizes three distinct response groups
 - **Virginia Emergency Operations Center**
 - *Overall Command and Control*
 - *Interface Between Emergency Support Function Groups (ESFs)*
 - *Development of Protective Actions*
 - **Dominion Energy Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)**
 - *Interface with Dominion Energy Emergency Response*
 - *Dose Assessment*
 - *Provide situational awareness on plant conditions and protective actions*
 - **Staging Area and Field Teams**
 - *Equip, brief, and deploy field teams*
 - *Analyze various samples*



Dominion Energy CERC



Dominion Energy CERC



State Emergency Operations Center (State PAR)




Field Monitoring





Factors Driving Protective Actions

- Plant conditions
 - A Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) is made whenever the plant upgrades to a General Emergency regardless of radiological releases
 - Evacuation is the default protective action outside of HAB incidents
- Radiological Factors (Dose Assessment and/or Field Data)
 - > 1R TEDE – Whole Body Dose
 - > 5R Adult CDE – Thyroid Dose
- Potassium Iodide
 - >5R Child CDE – Thyroid Dose


Protective Actions (Evacuation)



Protective Actions (Escalation)






North Anna Power Station GE Default PAR - Wind from 247












EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE

Virginia Localities Proximity to Nuclear Power Stations

-  10 Mile Emergency Planning Zones
-  50 Mile Ingestion Pathways Zones
-  Localities <10 Miles from Plants

Localities <50 Miles from Plants Power Plant (Num of Localities)

-  All 3 Power Plants (3)
-  NAPS / SPS (6)
-  NAPS / CCPS (6)
-  SPS / CCPS (4)
-  SPS Only (26)
-  NAPS Only (20)
-  CCPS Only (3)



Protective Action Development

- State PAR is communicated to all of the Emergency Planning Zone localities
- If all localities agree with the proposed State PAR it is presented to the State Coordinator (or his/her designee) at the Virginia Department of Emergency Management
- If approved by the State Coordinator the State PAR is presented to the Governor (or his/her designee).
- Once approved by the Governor the State PAR becomes the official Protective Action Decision (PAD)
- The PAD is communicated to the localities where it is put into action